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Economic ResearchNon technical summary
In times ofpersistently high unemployment, labour market policy measures become
increasingly important. Apart from traditional programmes such as continuous
vocational training or re-education, the transition into self-employment is promoted
in many industrialised countries. The aim is to shift people out ofthe unemployment
status and to reduce the level of unemployment. In Germany, the transition from
unemployment to self-employment is supported by the Federal Employment
Services by so-called bridging allowances. Since August 1994, the conditions for
receiving allowances were considerably eased, which led to a sharp increase in the
number of people subsidised. In 1996, the transition of 90,000 unemployed people
into self-employment was supported, compared to 25,000 in 1993.
A discussion of expected costs and benefits of self-employment gives reason to
assume that the threshold ofexpected income at which a decision in favour of self-
employment is made is lower for unemployed people. Opp'ortunity costs ofbusiness
formation by unemployed persons probably lie below those of an employed person
with the same endowment of human and financial capital, while the sunk costs
might be higher, depending on unemployment duration and expected labour
demand. It can be expected that business start-ups by unemployed people are
smaller, require less capital, are more risky and tend to occur in industries with
lower market entry costs. However, not much is known about firm development.
This study compares firm survival and employment growth of start-ups by
unemployed persons in East and West Germany as promoted by the Work Support
Act with start-ups by non-unemployed. The empirical analysis is based on a sample
of newly founded firms from the ZEW Firm Start-up Panel. The sample contains
firms which were founded between 1993 and 1995 and could be observed at least
one year after their foundation in 4 regions of East and 11 regions of West
Germany. In the econometric analysis, self-selection effects are taken into account
by using simultaneous models of start-up promotion and firm development. While
firm survival seems to be negatively affected by foundation from unemployment,
especially in the East German regions, an influence on employment growth is not
evident. The results of the econometric analyses indicate that selectivity effects
indeed seem to have some influence on firm survival, although not on employment
growth. Start-ups from unemployment in the new federal states have a slightly
significant, lower one-year survival probability. In terms of employment growth,
they are no different from unsubsidised firms. In the old federal states, these start-
ups show not worse survival probability and also no lower employment growth than
other companies.Business Start-ups by the Unenlployed - an
Econometric Analysis Based on Firm Data
by
FriedheIm Pfeiffer & Frank Reize*
Centrefor European Economic Research (ZEW)
October 1998
Abstract:
This study investigates firm survival and employment growth of start-ups by
unemployed people in East and West Germany as promoted by the Work Support
Act (so called bridging allowances). In 1994, the services provided were improved
considerably, which led to a sharp increase in the number of start-ups by the
unemployed. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of newly founded firms
from the ZEW Firm Start-up Panel. The sample contains firms which were founded
between 1993 and 1995 and could be observed at least one year after their
foundation in 4 regions of East and 11 regions of West Germany. In the
econometric analysis, self-selection effects are taken into account by using
simultaneous models of start-up promotion and firm development. While firm
survival seems to be negatively affected by foundation from unemployment,
especially in the East German regions, an influence on employment growth is not
evident.
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In times of persistently high unemployment, labour market policy measures become
increasingly important. Apart from traditional programmes such as continuous
vocational training or re-education, the transition into self-employment is promoted
in many industrialised countries. The aim is to shift people out of the unemployed
status and to reduce the level of unemployment. This can happen directly by
supporting the transition into self-employment and indirectly by creating further
jobs in the newly founded firms. In Germany, the transition from unemployment to
self-employment is supported by the Federal Employment Services by so-called
bridging allowances. Since August 1994, the conditions for receiving allowances
were considerably eased, which led to a sharp increase in the number of people
subsidised. In 1996, the transition of 90,000 unemployed people into self-
employment was supported, compared to 25,000 in 1993.
The aim of this study is to assess the effects of firm formation by the unemployed
through transition money in terms of firm sUJ::vival and employment growth using
firm-level data. This can basically be made from either a labour market economics
or an industrial economics perspective. From a labour market economics point of
view, the focus is on the person and her occupational alternatives. The path to self-
employment, whether with or without governmental support, competes with the
return to a dependent employment relationship, ifavailable. 1
On the other hand, an industrial economics approach would place the market entry
and the subsequent firm development in the centre of attention.
2 The two
perspectives can be integrated. In this paper the development of new enterprises
started from unemployment is compared with other starts-ups. In order to do this a
regional sample from data collected by the ZEW Start-up Panel is combined with
information on bridging allowances by the Federal Employment Services. The
industrial and labour market economics approach are integrated, using firm specific
and personal characteristics ofthe founder and any shareholders as well.
Econometric analyses in the area of start-up promotions are rather rare to date.
3 Due
to an insufficient data availability, studies might suffer from a lack of an adequate
I This is investigated in the literature on the determinants of self-employment, see for example
Pfeiffer and Pohlmeier (1992). In this literature typically the role of human capital, minority
status, family networks, liquidity constraints, etc. are used to explain occupational choice.
Determinants for this are, among others, capital intensity, returns to scale and market entry
barriers created by enterprises already active in the market, see for example Audretsch (1995).
BrUder! et. al. (1996) examined, based on data of the Munich Founder Study, the effects of
governmental start-up subsidies. Benus et al. (1994) investigated the effect of a social
experiment of governmental start-up promotion. More recently, O'Leary (1998) evaluated self-
employment promotion among the unemployed in Hungary and Poland. There are much morecontrol group for the group of subsidised companies or people. Therefore,
selectivity effects can influence the measurement of firm development.
4 This study
takes the selectivity effects into account and tries to avoid the bias created by
selectivity effects through the use of simultaneous models. In order to determine the
impact of foundation from unemployment on the respective firms, a model is
estimated which simultaneously explains company development and the foundation
from unemployment respectively the eligibility for subsidisation.
5 Further, the effect
of promotion on employment growth can only be estimated in the sample taken
among the surviving and thus potentially more successful companies.
The paper is structured as follows. In section two, theoretical aspects about the way
the bridging allowance takes effect and about start-ups by unemployed or employed
people are discussed. Section three contains a description of the data. The fourth
section presents the econometric modelling of company development, taking into
account promotion by the unemployed. In the subsequent chapter the estimation
results are discussed. The final chapter summarises the results and ends with a
preview offuture research work.
2 Aspects of the microeconomics of start-ups and the
institutional arrangements ofbridging allowance
2.1 The transition to self-employment
An individual's decision to form a company, given prevailing governmental
conditions
6
, depends on the attractiveness of the available alternatives for making a
living. This attractiveness is basically determined by initial financial endowment,
human capital, the readiness to take risks, the wish for independence and the social
and family networks. These factors are also closely related to the size of the
company that self-employed people establish in Germany, see Pfeiffer (1994).
studies for evaluating further vocational training and re-education measures, see for example
Friedlander et al (1997).
4 In the specific example of the "bridging allowances", the access to subsidies depends on the
design of the programme, which is restricted to unemployed people. Only those unemployed
people who can submit a sound business plan for the set-up receive subsidies. This is
presumably not a random sample of all unemployed people.
5 In the following subsidisation and foundation from unemployment is taken as equivalent. Other
forms offirms promotion are not taken into account.
6 According to the German economic and trade regulations in principle everybody is allowed to
start a business in the private sector of the economy. However, in the craft sector as well as in
some professional occupations (for example lawyer, doctor) special examinations or vocational
degrees, and in the banking and insurance sector some minimum requirements with respect to
initial capital are a necessary precondition for being self-employed.
2An unemployed or employed person will decide in favour of self-employment if the
expected benefits exceed her present benefits or, in the case of the unemployed
person, exceed the expected benefit from permanent employment weighted with the
probability of finding a job. The expected level of costs and benefits presumably
differs between the unemployed and employed. At the commencement ofa business
start-up, a substantial input may be necessary which might possess the
characteristics of sunk costs. Apart from investment in human capital and efforts
made for the establishments of networks, this refers to financial needs which depend
on both the legal form and on the particular trade or industry. The capital
endowment has to be covered by savings of the founder or by funds from banks or
by other sources. The expected, although uncertain, profits should generally be
higher for previously employed founders due to their higher opportunity costs as
wage workers.
Additional sunk costs are created by the fact that the unemployed founder has to
reduce his search for permanent employment and thus may miss potentially more
rewarding offers. Unemployed people might therefore experience higher sunk costs
in starting a business than the employed, but lower opportunity costs in terms of
foregone income. Microeconomic search theory provides a guideline for analysing
search behaviour of the unemployed. As far as we know, the extension of this
theory to include the choice of self-employment as an alternative to wage work is
still to be made. Due to the diversity ofthe additional alternatives, it would certainly
not be less complex. Instead ofjob offers, the unemployed person has to deal with
market niches, product prices and production possibilities. One can assume that the
information requirements ofsuch a step lie above those ofan employee.
The studies by Lucas (1978), Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), Evans and Jovanovic
(1989) model the role of management capabilities, risk preferences and the initial
capital endowment for the decision between self-employment and wage work in the
framework of market clearing, flexible wages. Unemployment, a form ofimbalance,
is not considered by these models. For authors following the tradition of J. A.
Schumpeter, the ability to overcome imbalances points to the presence of
entrepreneurial skills (see Schultz, 1981). A situation of economic imbalance, such
as high unemployment, leads people to become entrepreneurs. This triggers a
process which can bring about new economic equilibria. Human capital, risk
preferences and initial capital endowment are also likely to give valuable hints for
modelling the microeconomic decision situation ofan unemployed person.
Schulz (1995) models the decision for self-employment status using life cycle
models and stresses the role of capital market restrictions and qualification
requirements for the particular point in time at which the transition to self-
employment takes place. Although the state of unemployment is not explicitly
modelled here, the considerations might well be transferred to the situation of an
unemployed person. However, these models, which are based on control theory,
should also become significantly more complex when the unemployed person can
3choose between both alternatives: wage and salary employment and self-
employment status.
Costs and benefits of company formations and alternative forms of earning a living
are determined by aggregate economic factors. Thus, there is a differentiation
between unemployment as a push factor and economic dynamics as a pull factor for
company formations.
7 A shift from wage employment to self-employment is more
likely to take place in a phase of general economic growth, since in such a phase,
profit expectations are higher. Contrarily, a weak labour market can be a decisive
factor for deciding upon self-employment. In times of increasing unemployment, an
unemployed person might be more or less "forced" into self-employment due to the
poor prospects offinding a job.8
The discussion of expected costs and benefits of self-employment gives reason to
assume that the threshold of expected income at which a decision in favour of self-
employment is made is lower for unemployed people than for the employed. The
opportunity costs of business formation by an unemployed person ceteris paribus,
i.e., given socio-demographic characteristics and capital endowment, probably lie
below those of an employed person, while the sunk costs might be higher,
depending on unemployment duration and expected labour demand. It can be
expected that business start-ups by unemployed people are smaller, require less
capital, are more risky and tend to occur in industries with lower market entry costs.
2.2 Bridging allowances
Start-ups from unemployment are subsidised as part ofactive labour market policies
in Germany. In order to allow and facilitate the transition into self-employment for
unemployed people, the Federal Employment Services may pay a so-called
"bridging allowance" according to §55a of the Labour Promotion Law.
9 The
prerequisite for the bridging allowance is that the applicant has received
7 The debate is about the relevance of unemployment push YS. demand pull factors for company
formations, see Meager (1992) and Staber and Bogenhold (1993).
8 The notion of demand pull and unemployment push is far from being conc!usi\e. It is possible
that people are forced into wage work as well as into self-employment. It is', of course, an
empirical question whether higher unemployment rates or a rising number of unemployed lead
to more people becoming self-employed.
9 'OberbrUckungsgeld'. The bridging allowance in §55a was first introduced with the 7th
amendment to the Labour Promotion Law (AFG) on January I, 1986. Since the 1st of January,
1998, the legal foundation has changed and now is § 57 of the 3rd Social Security Code. The
following countries also have programmes to smooth the path into self-employment for
unemployed people: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Great Britain,
Ireland, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United
States (GECD, 1995).
4"unemployment pay" or "unemployment assistance" for at least four weeks.
1O Not
every form of self-employed work is supported. The activity has to comprise of at
least 18 hours a week. A competent authority (for example, a chamber ofcommerce
and industry, a trade or professional association or a tax consultant) has to assess
the sustainability of the self-employment envisaged. This assessment is meant to
ensure that the unemployed person, after a certain starting phase, earns a gross
monthly income that is at least two thirds of the income of an employed person.
These restrictions aim to prevent promotion of politically disputed "fictitious self-
employment"" and those start-ups by unemployed people funded by the authorities
which are badly prepared due to low opportunity costs.
The introduction of the Labour Promotion Law on the 1st of August, 1994,
represents the most recent legal change in labour promotion, bringing with it a
considerable improvement of promotion terms. Since August 1994, self-
employment promotion through a bridging allowance is no longer limited to a
maximum of 26 weeks. Allowances are generally granted for this period oftime and
for the amount ofthe last paid unemployed assistance.
12 In addition, during the time
of the support the contributions to health and nursing insurance, as well as to the
retirement fund are financed in an amount equal to the social security contributions
which were last paid for the unemployed person.
In 1995, the financial expenditure with which a transition to self-employment was
supported, was on average approximately 11,000 DM per unemployed person (see
table 1).13 After 1994, the improvement in the terms of promotion and the growing
unemployment led to a significant increase in the use of the bridging allowance and
thus also to an increase in total expenditures for this form offinancial support. 14
10 §55a (I) of the AFG. Supported are not only unemployed people, but also people threatened by
unemployment, i.e. workers with reduced hours and employees who have participated in work
creat.ion measures according to § 91 to 96 AFG or measures according to §249h and §242s
AFG. The latter ones are measures that support the reintegration of unemployed people by
financing environmental protection, social and youth work.
II A self-employed person is considered fictitiously self-employed, if she is doing work which in
f<lct has all the characteristics of wage work. There might be an incentive for classifying jobs as
self-employment because then employers do not have to pay the social insurance transfers of
about 21 % ofthe wage bill.
12 Since the introduction of §55a, the promotion terms were adjusted and changed several times.
Phases ofa rather restrictive interpretation (1988 - 1993) have alternated with phases of a rather
liberal use (1986 - 1988 and from 1994 onwards).
13 Table I furthermore contains the number of self- and unemployed people from 1991 to 1997,
the number of receipts of bridging allowances and the total amount of money that it costs.
14 The importance that is attributed by the government to bridging allowances can be seen in the
comparison of the respective budgets for active labour market policy. In 1996, the expenditure
amounted to 41.2 billion DM altogether, which was 30.1 % of the total budget of the Federal
5»>Table I about here«<
According to the terms of the promotion, an unemployed person does not lose his or
her right to unemployment payments or assistance by a transition into self-
employment. Thus, even with very low expected revenues, the transition into self-
employment seems to be attractive for economic reasons, at least in the short run
and for people facing poor prospects as wage workers or slack labour markets.
The novel element of this study lies in the assessment of firm foundation from
unemployment subsidised with the bridging allowances for determining company
success. In calculating the effect of the subsidised foundation, two adverse aspects
to be taken into account. On the one hand, subsidised company formations might
have a higher capital endowment than comparable formations that are not
supported. This can have a positive influence on the development of the new
enterprise. However, statements aoout the sustainability of the effect of an average
promotional sum of 11,000 OM cannot be made based on theoretical reasons.
On the other hand, opportunistic behaviour cannot be excluded, as there are hardly
any opportunity costs not applying for bridging allowances for some applicants. If
promotional payments according to §55a are received, the right to unemployment
payments or assistance is extended by six months. Insofar, a company formation
could be initiated with the aim of receiving unemployment payments for half a year
longer. Therefore, it is not possible to clearly determine the effects of the bridging
allowance on company survival and employment growth by means ofa theory.
2.3 Empirical studies on bridging allowance
In order to obtain results on both the use and success of bridging allowances, the
Institute for Employment Research in Nuremberg (lAB) carried out several analyses
of recipients of bridging allowances. The first sample contained people who
received a bridging allowance between 1986 and 1988 (see Kaiser and Otto, J990).
The aim was to determine the influence of legislative changes on the granting of
bridging allowances, the tendency to become unemployed again after the
subsidisation and the socio-demographic structure of the brid~ing allowance
recipients. '
The second sample on bridging allowances began in 1994. The lAB obtained a full
census of the founder cohort during 1994/95 in 15 selected labour market districts:
Schwerin, Berlin (East), Oessau, and Pima in the new German federal states, and
Bremen, Hanover, Kassel, Essen, Hof, Bayreuth, Bad Kreuznach, Mainz,
Oeggendorf, Landshut and Goppingen in the old states. The 4,486 people who were
Employment Services. One billion DM was spent for the bridging allowance, compared to
almost ]8 billion DM for training measures.
6subsidised can be subdivided into "old cases" (subsidisation in the 1st/2nd quarter
of 1994 before the promotion terms were improved on August I, 1994) and "new
cases" (4th quarter 1994, 1st/2nd quarter 1995, after a further improvement to the
promotion terms). For an analysis ofthe differences in the socio-economic structure
ofthe recipients of payments, see WieBner (1998).
Of those who received a bridging allowance in the years 1994 and 1995, 38 weeks
after the start of the promotion, 5.4% were again registered as unemployed; after
expiration of 78 weeks or more, this figure rose to 6.9%. Basically this study could
not find any differences between old and new cases. These company founders were
surveyed again at a later point in time. One finding is that after three years, 70.4%
of the subsidised people were still self-employed, 12% were working in an
employment relationship that was subject to social security payments and
approximately 13% were again registered as unemployed.
3 Data and descriptive statistics: ZEW Firm Start-up Panel
3.1 Samples and definitions
The basis of the econometric analysis is a regional sample of the ZEW Firm Start-
up Panel.
15 The sample unit is the legally independent enterprise and not the
operational facility. The ZEW Firm Start-up Panel contains newly registered
enterprises in Western and Eastern Germany. Updated data relating to enterprises
already contained in the database are also available. The information on the
enterprises questioned includes their legal form, a five-digit industry code, number
ofemployees and employee structure, date offormation (for take-overs also the date
offormation of the predecessor company), date of the trade register entry, turnover,
number of shareholders, debt composition and information on a shut-down other
than by a bankruptcy or collection proceedings.
Since in the Federal Republic of Germany there are no official statistics which
cover company set-ups completely, reliably, and with sufficient time
disaggregation, statements on the degree to which new companies are contained in
the Start-up Panel are only possible with limitations. Not all companies are required
to be officiaUy registered. The probability of being registered is influenced by
firms' need for loans and the scope of their business relationships to other
companies. Very small companies, agricultural enterprises and professionals in
medicine, law, architecture are likely to be under-represented.
The sample used in this study is constructed in two steps. First, it consists of all
people contained in the database which are involved in an enterprise and which
15 The data of the ZEW Start-up Panel had been made available to the ZEW since 1989 every six
months by the Association "Verband der Vereine Creditreform" (VVC). For further details on
the concept ofthe ZEW Start-up Panel, see Stahl (1991) and Harhoffand Steil (1997).
7address reside in the postal code area of the 15 labour market districts examined in
the course of the §55a-sample of the lAB. In the context of a co-operative project
with the Institute for Employment Research, by means of data comparison, those
people in the sample who received bridging allowances are identified. In a second
step, a sample of enterprises started by those people is compiled. Thus, this sample
includes companies in which subsidised people are involved and companies for
which this is not the case. An enterprise is categorised as being founded by
promotion of an unemployed if at least one person involved in this enterprise
received promotion. Only the cohort of companies which were set up between the
4th quarter of 1993 and the first half of the 3rd quarter of 1995 is considered.
16
Furthermore, only those companies are contemplated which are also eligible for
subsidisation according to Labour Promotion Law. For example, non-profit
associations are excluded. Last but not least, only companies of the same size as the
largest subsidised enterprises are examined. These are start-ups with an initial
maximum of 15 employees in the old German federal states and 18 employees in the
new states.
After the selection, the sample taken from the eleven labour market districts in the
old federal states lists 5,302 enterprises, of which 223 are promoted from
unemployment. The sample from the four labour market districts in the new federal
states lists 4,311 enterprises, of which 395 are promoted from unemployment (see
Table 2).
»>Table 2 about here«<
3.2 Firm heterogeneity and promotion ofthe unemployed
The factors which characterise the heterogeneity of start-ups, and which are
included in the econometric specification of the subsidisation equation explained in
section 4, are: legal form, industry, the investment/shareholder structure and the
economic diversification (see Table 3). Following the discussion in section 2, firms
that are formed by unemployed people should, as a rule, be rather small, "easily"
16 This means that the period analysed by the lAB is always extended by a quarter, because there is
the possibility that an application for a trade register entry was filed before the subsidies were
granted, or a company was formed some time after the support was granted.
8founded firms with low capital endowmene
7 and for this reason likely to have the
legal form ofa non-corporatefirm or a sole proprietorship. 18
The legal form is divided into three categories: trade enterprise and sole
proprietorship, non-corporate firm and corporations. In the old German federal
states, 67.26 % of subsidised start-ups are trade enterprises and 13.45 %, are non-
corporate firms. In the new German federal states non-corporate firms are
represented more often, with 16.21 % among the subsidised start-ups.
»>Table 3 about here«<
Subsidised start-ups are more likely to be found in the service sector, in which
market entry costs and capital intensity are relatively low, rather than in the
manufacturing sector. In the estimates, ten industry dummies are used. The
industries include manufacturing, construction~ automotive dealerships and repair
service, retail trade, wholesale trade, hospitality, transportation! communication!
insurance/ finance, data processing, business services and other services.'9 The
primary sector is excluded from the analysis, since agricultural enterprises are not
eligible for promotion. In the old German federal states, the subsidised firms are
often involved in construction, automotive dealerships and repair service and data
processing. In Eastern Germany, subsidised firms are started more often in
automotive dealerships and business-related services.
In the framework ofthis study, networks refer to business relationships and indicate
whether the firm's most important shareholder is also a shareholder of one or more
other firms. The persons involved in the start-up are called personal shareholders in
the following. They are measured ranging from one additional shareholder, two,
three ,and more. Subsidised start-ups from unemployment tend to have more
personal shareholders, but a smaller number of them has a network. A company is
regarded as divers~fied if it is active in more than one industry/economic area,
measured on the basis oftwo-digit industry classification code.
Apart from business-related characteristics, firm foundation from unemployment
depends on the economic environment which is included in the regression in the
17 BrUderl et al. (1996) obtain an average capital endowment of93,000 OM for companies formed
by previously employed people and an average of 34,000 OM for companies formed by
previously unemployed people.
18 A trade business can be registered and closed down without major formalities, while the set-up
ofa limited liability company, which is in our context equal to corporations, requires an entry in
the trade register and the deposit of the nominal capital. As a rule this requires a notary
certification.
19 For the new German federal states, the areas ofdata processing and other services are combined
for data reasons.
9enterprises - ranging from a few weeks up to more than two years. For lack of an
exact death date and the differing lengths of the intervals, the binary probability
"that a company has survived at least one year" is used as measure for the success
of a company. Those companies, which at an age of below one year do not have
close-down notices and/or their first close-down is noticed after more than one year,
were excluded from the analysis.
21 The survival probability of the remaining
companies lies at 90.3% in the old federal states for the subsidised and at 89.5% for
the non-subsidised companies. In the new German federal states, 93.8% of the
subsidised and 91.8% of the non-subsidised start-ups survive the first year (see
Table 4). ~.
»>Table 4 about here«<




with InB(ti) being the logarithm of the employment at the time of examination and
t, being the point in time.
When determining the growth rate, just as when analysing the survival probability,
the problem arises that the data needed are not available for all companies in
equidistant time intervals. The points of time t, and t2 are chosen· in a way that the
point oftime 1ofthe earliest statement on employment and the second point oftime
corresponds to the number of employees determined last. Time dummies shall
control for the different periods and lengths of the time intervals. The average
growth rate is 18% for the subsidised in the western part of Germany and 15% for
the non subsidised start-ups. In the eastern part, the growth rate for subsidised start-
ups lies at 15% and for non-subsidised start-ups at 13% (see Table 4).
3.4 Factors influencing company growth
Companies formed by unemployed people possibly have, due to their comparably
low endowment of tangible assets and human capital, worse chances for surviving
and growing. The analysis takes into account the firm heterogeneity by including
among others the legal form, industry type, the size at market entry and information
on the human capital of the founder. Along with the sex of the most important
21 For these firms, about 40% ofall start-ups, it cannot be said for sure whether they have survived
the first year or not. Since this is a high number of missing data, the survival equation has been
estimated also under the assumption, that 10%, 50% or all firms are in fact closed down after
one year.
11person involved (female), age is used as a logarithm and as a polynomial of second
order (age squared). A better human capital endowment promises a higher
productivity of the founder (e.g. better management capabilities) and thus
presumably a higher success ofthe enterprise.
Companies which receive loans show a tendency to take higher risks after market
entry, as they can shift their profit expectations to their benefit and at the cost of
their creditors. This is especially true for limited liability companies, which are not
liable to the full amount of their assets when they set up a risky company or one
with little chances to survive.
22 On the other hand, the higher readiness to take risks
can also result in higher profits when the company survives.
According to the liability ofsmallness hypothesis smaller firms have lower survival
probabilities (see BrUded et al. 1992). Due to higher sunk costs, bigger firms
prepare their market entry better and put greater effort into the choice of their
projects (see Troske 1995). In this sense, the initial size (log size, log size squared)
represents an indicator for the otherwise unknown planning intensity. When
analysing employment development, the initial employment also serves in checking
the relevance of Gibrats Law, according to which the growth of a company is
independent ofits size (see Evans 1987, Hall 1987).
Subsidised firms in the old German federal states show a somewhat lower initial
employment level, with two employees compared to the 2.3 employees of non-
subsidised companies (Table 3). The same is true for the new German federal states,
where the level of initial employment is 2.2 employees for subsidised and 2.7
employees for non-subsidised start-ups. The inclusion of regional dummies allows a
control for the regional differences in start-up dynamics, capturing region-specific
economic development or infrastructure.
When determining the survival probability, bridging allowance is included in the
form of a qualitative variable in the regression. A further differentiation between
old cases (start-up before August 1, 1994) and new cases (start-up thereafter) turned
out to be insignificant. In the following section, we present an econometric model
using data from the ZEW Start-up Panel for estimating the impact of the subsidised
firm foundation from unemployment on survival probabilities and employment
growth.
22 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). For an empirical examination of the influence of the legal form
on insolvency, see Harhoffet al. (1996).
124.1 Firm start-ups by the unemployed and selectivity
For the quantitative analysis of assessing the direct impact of social programmes,
basically two methods are available, the experimental and the non-experimental
(econometric) method.
23 Both methods aim at solving the fundamental problem of
every assessment. This problem consists of the fact that one can view a person or a
firm at a given point in time either only as participant or as non-participant of a
measure. However, the analysis of an effect is based on the difference between
participation and non-participation. One would like to know what would have
happened if a person had not participated in a programme or in terms of our study
what would have happened if the company had been formed by a formerly
employed person without subsidisation through bridging allowances. The
aforementioned fundamental problem does not allow this direct comparison, and
thus one has to resort to appropriate econometric methods. The main difficulty
involves finding an adequate control group despite self-selection or programme
selection.
The econometric framework of programme evaluation is also appropriate in this
study. As discussed in section two firm foundation from unemployment is allied
with various selection processes. For investigating the impact of subsidised firm
foundation from unemployment, the econometric approach assembles the control
group ex post from non-participants. In the case of self or programme selection,
participants and the members of the non-experimental control group can differ in
their success already before the start-up, that is, the two samples might not be
random samples.
To study the influence of selectivity on outcome measures in what follows, 1';"
represents the success of person or firm i without promotion. d stands for the
promotion. d; =O. if the person has not received bridging allowances and d; =1, if
she has. The expected outcome before market entry is different ifit is assumed that:
(1) E[Y,"ld, = I]* E[Y,"ld, = 0],
The outcome Y, ofperson i is given by:
(2) Y, = Y," + d, Y, for start-ups promoted from unemployment, and ,
Y, = Y," for the other start-ups,
23 See Heckman and Smith (1996) or Friedlander et al.. The experimental method is not further
discussed here.
13where ]1 represents the effect of starting a firm with the help of bridging allowances
from unemployment. Given the case that the impact is the same for all participants
(]1:= r), it follows:
(3) Y= E[yjldj = 1] = E[y' - y'''ldj = 1].
For the expected subsidisation success of a representative unemployed, one then
obtains
(4) E[y'ld; = 1] = y+ E[Y;"ld, = I],
and for the other start-ups
(5) E[y'ldj =0]= E[Y;"ld, =0].
As a difference between the two expected values one obtains
(6) E[Y; Idj = 1] - E[Y; Idj = 0] = y + {E[Y;" Idj = 1]- E[Y;" Id; = OJ} .
The term in curved brackets {} depicts the selection bias. If this term equals zero,
there is no difference between start-ups in terms of their success before market
entry. Otherwise a comparison of success before and after market entry, however
measured, will be biased. Part of the selection mechanisms might remain
unobserved. The problem of selection based on unobserved variables (see Heckman
and Hotz, 1989) arises when variables that are important for success and selection
are not contained in the dataset. This problem cannot be ruled out totally for the
current analysis, since variables characterising the founder's endowment of
firi'ancial and human capital might be missing.
Neglecting selection effects can result in inconsistent estimates. To demonstrate
this; equation (2) is extended as follows:
(7) y; =x:p+d) +£j,
where Yi shall again represent company success, Xi a vector of influential factors on
company success, di bridging allowances and Ej is assumed to be a normally
distributed error term. In this formulation the success of the enterprise depends on
promotion, other observable factors and an error term. The probability of being a
firm promoted from unemployment shall be given by:
(8) (( = w;d+ U;
where d;' represents a latent unobservable variable for which the following binary
selection rule applies:
d, = J if (> 0
d, =0 otherwise
14Wi represents the vector of the variables determining the type of start-up, while Ui is
assumed to be a standard normally distributed error term. The variance-covariance-
matrix ofthe two error terms is given by
From this ensues the expected company success:
(9) E!.v, Ix,.diJ= xjb +dig + E[e, IXi' di J.
'---v--'
~o
where E[E,lxi ,dj ] corresponds to the term in the curved brackets in equation (6).
'------v----'
~O
Thus, for equation (9) the assumptions ofthe standard regression model are violated
and OLS results in an inconsistent estimation ofy.
4.2 Modelling survival probability
The first measure of success is qualitative in nature and indicates whether the
company is still active one year after it was formed. Starting from equations (7) and
(8), the following system oftwo binary probit equations results:
(7a) M,· =x;f3+d,Y+EiM (survival equation)
(8) d,· = w;c5+u, (start-up from unemployment).
Mi· and d," represent unobservable latent variables for each of which the
following selection rule applies:
M I = I if M: > 0, enterprise survives
= 0 otherwise
and
d I = 1 if d: >0, enterprise formed from unemployment
= 0 otherwise
EiM shall be assumed to be standard normally distributed error term. The variance-
covariance-matrix ofthe error terms is given by
(E'M) (1 PM) VM =Var u, = PM I .
Maximum-likelihood estimation ofthe bivariate probit model takes into account the
correlation ofthe error terms and results in a consistent estimate ofy.
154.3 Modelling employment growth
The estimate ofemployment growth proceeds in a similar framework. However, two
further selection problems have to be taken into account. First, the estimate can be
carried out only for the surviving, i.e. the successful companies. However, what one
tries to measure is an effect for all start-ups and not only for the group of surviving
companies. An estimate using the sample of the surviving companies can
overestimate effects on employment growth ("Survivor-Bias"). A second selection
process might result-from data-problems, since information on employment growth
is missing for 53.5% of the enterprises in the old German federal states and 46.6%
in the new German federal states in the ZEW Start-up Panel. It cannot be ruled out
that for companies with worse development more information is available, as these
companies are better examined due to the specific objective of the set of data.
Especially for enterprises with payment difficulties, inquiries to the VVC by
suppliers and customers will be made more frequently.
Thus, when estimating employment growth, two concurring selection mechanisms
are at work. The probability that there is a usable statement on employment for a
firm depends, on the one hand, on the variables determining the survival
probability, and, on the other hand, on the variables evaluating the payment
histories and the credit worthiness of a company (equation (10), see section 3.4).
From this the following, somewhat extended model ensues:
(10) S~ = </3s +d;ys +z;ws +C;s (observation in the sample),
(start-up from unemployment)
(employment growth)
where s;· represents a latent variable, Zj a vector of additional variables explaining
whether information on employment is available. Cjs is assumed to be a standard
normally distributed error term and Cjg a normally distributed error term with the
expected value zero. gj stands for the growth rate of employment. For the latent
variable s;·,the following selection rule applies:
Sj = 1 if Si· > 0 observation in the sample
= 0 otherwise
Employment growth is examined only if Sj=1. The simplified assumption that the
random disturbance terms of the type of enterprise and observation equation are
independent from each other leads to the following variance-covariance-matrix :
[
£iKl [CYKPKPsl
v. =Var U j = P K 1 0 .
C,S I Ps 0 1 J
16From this assumption, a partly recursive equation structure ensues, which can be
estimated in two steps. In the first step, the probability is estimated that an
observation for employment growth is available. The Inverse Mills Ratio calculated
from a probit model is then included, in the second step, in the growth equation as
an additional explaining variable. As in the model for the survival probability, this
is estimated simultaneously with the promotion equation for the sample of those
enterprises for which information on employment growth is available.
5 Results
5.1 Start-ups promoted from unemployment
First, the results of the equation determining the type of firm are discussed in the
context of the bivariate probit analysis (equation (8); see Table 5).24 The probability
of belonging to the group of start-ups promoted form unemployment differs
between the old and the new German federal states. As a whole, the model is better
suited to explain promotion in the old German federal states than in the new ones.
As the number ofobservations for both regions differ only slightly from each other,
the result points to a greater similarity of the enterprises in the new German federal
states independent ofpromotion.25
In the old German federal states, belonging to the group of enterprises started from
unemployment is more likely in non-corporate firms and trade enterprises than
corporations. The unemployment to vacancy ratio leads to a significantly26 higher
percentage of subsidised start-ups. In the new German federal states, the legal form
plays no measurable role and the measure ofregional labour market tightness acts in
the opposite direction. A possible explanation for this unexpected result is a
stronger competition between bridging allowances and other active labour market
programmes for the unemployed in East Germany.27
In the old German federal states, subsidised start-ups can be found with a higher
probability in the areas construction, automotive dealerships and repair services,
data processing and business-related services. In the new German federal states, no
24 Despite substantially smaller samples, the coefficients of this equation in the employment
model (see Table 7) differ only to a minor degree from the coefficients here.'
25 It is probably the case that some start-ups which were categorised as non-subsidised in this
study have received other kinds of promotion. This might be one factor explaining the greater
similarity between the two groups in East Germany, since considerable amounts of firm
subsidies have flowed into the new German federal states.
26 In the following, a coefficient is regarded as significantly different from zero when an error
probability lies below 5%. At an error probability below 10%, the difference may be regarded as
weakly significant.
27 Especially vocational training, re-education as well as public works programmes.
17sector-related differences can be observed. Both in the old and in the new German
federal states, subsidised start-ups tend to involve several shareholders, which
could point to the significance of social networks for firm foundation by the
unemployed. In both regions, subsidised start-ups were begun significantly more
often in the fourth quarter of 1994 and in the first quarter of 1995. This indicates
that the extension of the services provided by bridging allowance indeed led to a
considerable increase in the number ofsubsidised companies.
5.2 Determinants offirm survival
In Eastern and Western Germany, the determinants of the probability of firm
survival differ to a lesser extent than the coefficients explaining the type of firm
(see table 5).28 In the new German federal states, the probability of surviving the
first year after commencement of business activities correlates with a value of 0.6
with the probability of having received bridging allowances. The high positive
correlation points to the existence of variables not taken into account which favour
bridging allowances as well as the survival chances. In the old German federal
states, the correlation turns out to have also a positive value, which does not differ
significantly from zero, however.
Both in the old and in the new German federal states, subsidisedfoundation from
unemployment lead, with otherwise equal observable characteristics, to a reduced
survival probability. However, this effect is not significant for the old German
federal states. For the new German federal states, the significance level is 12%,
which indicates that the simultaneous approach seems to be worthwhile.
29 Without
taking into account the correlation, the subsidisation effect in the univariate probit
model in the new federal states is not significant at all with a positive sign.~o
The result provoke some explanations. One would expect that the correlation is
negative due to important factors that are not available in the dataset. Those could
be, for example, human capital variables and more detailed information on work
history, such as the duration or frequency of the unemployment spells. But in fact
the group of non-subsidised firms seems to be a group of firms with lower a priori
survival chances after controlling for observable characteristics. One reason might
be that the subsidised firms identified in the ZEW-Start-up Panel are not a random
selection of all subsidised firms. That means after controlling \for observable
28 Additional estimations with a reduced set of variables (groups of variables which are
in~ignificant at the 10 % level had been excluded) are presented in Table Sa. There are no major
qualitative differences between table 5 and Sa.
29 Slightly altered specifications revealed a negative effect for the new federal states at a
significance level of 6%. So we regard the effect as preliminary, but weakly significant. The
estimate can be obtained upon request.
~o The estimates can be obtained upon request.
18characteristics the subsidised perform better than the non-subsidised, because they
are those with the best survival perspectives among all firms promoted with
bridging allowances.
The relative large coefficient ofsubsidisedfoundation from unemployment might be
due to the possibility that in the bivariate probit model the two equations are similar
in terms ofthe specification and the left hand side variable (see Greene, 1998).31 To
derive quantitative results one has to compute the marginal effects.32 In East
Germany firms starting from unemployment have a 1.8% lower survival probability.
Other start-ups would have a 16% lower survival probability in the case they would
have been promoted with bridging allowances. Although the interpretation of this
latter effect is not clearly obvious (see Greene 1998), the unemployed might in fact
have a 1,8% to 16% higher probability offailure. This possibly could be attributable
to opportunistic behaviour with respect to the bridging allowances scheme.
Alternatively, it is also possible that the end of transition money after six months
leads to a revision of plans and to close down -the enterprise because of changing
expectations on costs and revenues.
The sensitivity analyses with respect to missing information on the mortality status
seem to confirm the negative results for East Germany. In West Germany, however,
the coefficient of bridging allowances became significantly positive under the
assumption that all firms with missing information where not alive. The results,
which are summarised in Table 5b, therefore, confirm the difference in firm
development in East and West Germany.
»>Table 5 and 5a about here«<
The remaining results shall be briefly summarised. The hypothesis of the higher
mortality of corporations compared to non-corporate firms does not hold true. For
corporations, close-downs as a form of market exit playa less important role. The
31 Atwo-step estimation, which was performed in order to get a more robust result, also yielded a
negative but smaller (-0.12 for eastern Germany) coefficient.
32 The marginal effects consists ofdirect and indirect effects and have been co~puted according to
the following equation (Greene 1996):
aBVN(4)(x;/3+y. w;~, p)/aXik = {~(x;/3+ y)4>«w;~- p(x;/3+Y))/ ~l-p2)l/3k directeffect
+(~(w;~)4>(x;/3+y) - p(w;~)/ ~l-p2) }~k indirecteffect
where BVN(.) is the bivariate normal distribution. 4>(.) the cumulative standard normal
distribution and ep(.) the standard normal density. The marginal effects are computed conditional
on ElM Id = 1] or E[M Id =0] , i.e. either on the group ofsubsidised or non-subsidised start-
ups.
19sample contained mainly voluntary shut-downs instead of insolvencies. In contrast,
sole proprietorships show a higher mortality rate than non-corporate firms.
The size of a company, measured by its initial number of employees, has no
measurable influence on survival probability. This result withdraw the often by the
small business literature mentioned hypothesis that newly founded small businesses
could improve their survival probability due to a larger number of initial employees
(see BrUder! et al., 1996). In construction, manufacturing and retail trade, firms in
the old federal states revealed the highest survival probabilities relative to
hospitality. In the new German federal states, survival probabilities in retailing and
in business-related services are higher than in construction.
The human capital variable, age of the most important person involved in the start-
up, has in the old federal states a significant, non-linear influence on survival
probability of the start-up. The survival probability reaches its peak at an age of
36.5 years. Both in the old and the new German federal states, company networks
reduce the survival probability of start-ups. In both-parts of Germany, start-ups by a
woman, as the most important person involved, have a slightly significantly lower
survival probability.
5.3 Determinants ofemployment growth
The results of the esti"mate of the employment equation are listed in Table 7.
33 Both
for the old and the new Federal states, the foundation from employment has no
effect on growth. The probability of being a start-up with bridging allowances also
does not correlate significantly with the level ofemployment growth.
34
»>Tables 6, 6a and 7, 7a about here«<
For the new and the old federal states, Gibrat's 'Law' can be abandoned. At first,
company growth declines with ascending initial employment and then increases
again, in the old federal states from ten employees and in the new federal states
from 124 employees.
35 In West German firms, corporations grow up to 23% faster
than non-corporate firms or sole proprietors. In the~new states, the differences are
33 See table 6 for the estimates ofthe probability that information on employment is available. See
Table 6a and Table 7a for the estimates without insignificant groups of variables. In East
Germany, the equation with the reduced vector ofvariables had to be estimated with a two-stage
method. Again, there are no major qualitative differences between the tables; so the results of
table 6 and 7 are discussed in the text.
.l4 The results of the simultaneous estimate and a simple estimate which takes promotion for
unemployment as exogenous do not, therefore, differ from each other.
~5 This is also the result of other studies, e.g. Evans (1987). As by far the majority of companies
has less than ten employees, the smallest enterprises grow the fastest.
20smaller. Between non-corporate firms and corporations, no significant differences
can be noticed in this part of Germany. With this result, the hypothesis that
corporations have the greater growth potentials ifthey survive cannot be confuted.
Company networks increase the growth in the new federal states by 10%, while
diversification has a slightly significant negative influence. In the old federal states,
networks have no differential growth effect. Age and gender (female) of the most
important person involved in the start-up are insignificant.
The Inverse Mills Ratio, which is calculated from the probit model for the
determination of the probability that information on employment is available (see
table 6), has a negative influence only for the new federal states (see table 7). The
counter-moving selection effects described in section 3.4 thus obviously offset each
other in the old federal states.
6 Conclusions and preview
The objective of this paper was to estimate whether start-ups from unemployment
perform different with respect to survival and employment growth. The database
was a regional sample of enterprises founded in 1993 to 1995 and contained in the
ZEW Firm Start-up Panel. Those start-ups which involve unemployed people
promoted with bridging allowances were compared to a group of firms which was
not aided by this instrument. In the context of bivariate probit models, an attempt
was made to model the selection effects accompanying the promotion and market
entry from unemployment, in order to estimate the impact of the employment status
of firm founders. For the growth analysis, a further selection effect, which ensues
from the fact that only the successful companies survive and grow, was considered.
The results of the econometric analyses indicate that selectivity effects indeed seem
to have some influence on firm survival, although not on employment growth.
Therefore, the use of more appropriate techniques, like simultaneous models are
warranted. Start-ups from unemployment in the new federal states have a slightly
significant, lower one-year survival probability. In terms of employment growth,
they are no different from non-subsidised firms. In the old federal states, these start-
ups show no worse survival probability and also no lower employment growth than
the other companies.
The absence of any significant impacts on employment growth and only a slightly
significant negative impact on firm survival does not justify the conclusion that the
bridging allowance has missed its aim. Founders from unemployment with
transition money seem to have no worse perspectives than the other founders in
West Germany and slightly worse perspectives in East Germany. This could not be
expected a priori. In that way bridging allowance maybe supported unemployed
founders to have the same chances as founders from employment due to a higher
capital endowment. The negative results for East Germany hint to the possibility of
opportunistic behaviour which should be investigated further (WieSner 1998 found
21that 41 % of the unemployed would have also started a business without bridging
allowances).
Be that as it may, one should keep in mind that the group of companies formed by
the unemployed and contained in the ZEW Firm Start-up Panel, probably does not
represent a random selection from the group of all enterprises subsidised through
the bridging allowance. It can be assumed that this group is rather one that is
especially active and successful. Finally, in the face of the methods used, the effects
should not be interpreted too hastily. Parametric methods for estimating selectivity
effects require comparably restrictive assumptions with respect to the distribution of
the error term and model specifications. Future studies based on longer firm
histories could attempt to compare the results of parametric approaches with non-
parametric methods, such as the matching approach (see Heckman et ai, 1998).
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25Tables
Table 1: Self-employment, unemployment and bridging allowances from 1991 to 1997
year number ofself-employed number of unemployed subsidised amount
people (millions) people (millions) unemployed ('000 DM)
1991 3.037 2.727 13,014 90.3
1992 3.091 2.979 31,587 136.4
1993 3.175 3.419 25,835 98.5
1994 3.288 3.698 37,297 194.8
1995 3.336 3.612 70,634 822.0
1996 3.409 3.965 89,744 1,063.0
1997 J528 4.385 78,824 944.0
Source: Statistical Yearbook ofGermany; WieBner (1998).
Table 2: Sample sizes ofthe different models
Region Western Germany Eastern Germany
Model non subsidised subsidised non subsidised subsidised
Whole sample 5079 223 3916 395
Survival probability 2237 124 2044 196
(Table 5)
Employment growth 1774 105 1609 1793
(Table 7)
Source: Regional sample ofthe ZEW Firm Start-up Panel.
26Table 3: Descriptive statistics ofthe business start-ups
Western Germany Eastern Germany
non subsidised subsidised non subsidised subsidised
Start-up employment (quantiles)
10% I I 1 1
50% I I 2 1
90% 5 4 6 5
MissinR, values (in %) 16.30 7.62 4.65 2.28
Legal form as (as percentage shares)
Trade enterprise I sole proprietorship 60.38 67.26 74.08 72.15
Non-corporatefirm 8.07 13.45 11.49 16.21
Corporate firm 31.54 19.28 14.43 11.64
Sector (as percentage shares)
Manufacturing 8.13 9.59 5.42 6.14
Construction 15.14 19.18 24.00 22.76
Auto dealerships & repairs services 3.74 8.22 3.89 6.91
Wholesale trade 8.03 7.76 7.44 9.72
Retail trade 21.21 22.83 18.29 18.93
Hospitality 10.02' 6.39 8.94 7.16
Communic.lTransp.lFinancellnsuran. 6.76 5.02 10.13 9.46
Data Processing 2.67 4.57 0.88 1.28
Business -related services 12.59 9.59 8.53 9.46
Other services 11.72 6.85 12.49 8.18
f·········· .........................................................................................
MissinR values 2.70 1.79 1.46 1.01
Diversification (business in more than one sector) (as percentage shares)
Non diversified 93.50 94.17 90.60 92.41
Diversified 6.50 5.83 9.40 7.59
Number ofadditional shareholders (as percenta e shares)
0 69.64 69.51 78.19 73.42
J 21.93 17.04 16.42 19.49
2 5.71 10.31 3.80 5.57
3 and more 2.72 3.14 2.41 1.52
Number ofassociated firms (Networks) (as percentage shares)
No associatedfirms 86.84 91.48 73.57 88.10
.Q.'!.~...O".~.. ~~I.o..!.~..c!.~§o..~i.qt.e..t!.fi.'.?'.'. ..~. 13.16 8.52 26.43 11.90 ......................... .............................. .................................................................... ...................................................................................................
MissinR value 0.18 0.00 0.10 0.00
27Table 3 continued
Unemployment to vacancies ratio 3.81 4.27 3.44 2.86
Labour market district (as percentage shares)
Bremen 12.72 11.66 --- ---
Hanover 15.57 24.66 --- ---
Kassel 9.39 14.35 --- ---
Essen 8.78 5.38 --- ---
Hof 4.43 6.73 --- ---
Bayreuth 4.35 4.48 --- ---
Bad Kreuznach 5.61 1.79 --- ---
Mainz 12.40 4.04 --- ---
Deggendorf 6.60 6.73 --- ---
Landshut 5.83 4.48 --- ---
Goppingen 14.31 15.70 --- ---
Schwerin --- --- 39.22 40.00
East Berlin --- --- 12.54 16.20
Dessau --- --- 23.26 '18.99
Pima --- --- 24.97 24.81
Age
10% 25.71 25.78 24.87 26.25
50% 35.30 34.39 35.45 35.80
90% 51.77 47.77 50.93 50.88 ...............................................-.-......................,.......................... ...................................................................................
MissinK value (in %) 17.25 17.04 25.54 29.87
Gender (as percentage shares)
Male 74.99 88.99 76.03 74.42
Female 25.01 11.01 23.97 25.58 ............................................................. ................ .
MissinK value 2.78 2.24 1.15 1.01
Credit worthiness (as percentage shares)
No credit experience 84.08 78.48 38.48 44.55
Credit advisedor possible 7.60 11.21 12.05 11.14
Limited credit 4.61 8.07 44.51 42.28
Secured credit 0.61 0.45 1.00 0.51
No credit recommended 3.11 1.80 3.96 1.52
Payment histories (as percentage shares)
No experience with respect to 90.91 91.93 54.01 60.25
!payment behaviour
Payment within 30days 0.18 0.00 "0.20 0.00
Pays bills without delay 4.51 4.94 38.97 36.71
Payment takes longer 1.03 1.35 2.86 1.51
Pays slowly 0.51 0.00 0.65 0.00
Payment after reminder 0.32 0.00 0.33 0.00
Payments overdue 2.56 1.79 2.99 1.52
Source: Regional sample ofthe ZEW Firm Start-up Panel.
28Table 4: Firm success
Western Germany Eastern Germany
non subsidised subsidised non subsidised subsidised
Status one year after start-up (shares in %)
Survived 89.48 90.28 91.80 93.77
Not survived 10.52 9.72 ·8.20 6.23
Missing values 47.96 35.43 29.34 30.89
Annual employment growth rate (in percent)
10% 0 0 -0.07 0
50% 0 0 0 0
90% 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.56
Mean 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.15 ..................................................... ........................
Missing values 53.99 42.60 46.81 44.05
Source: Regional sample of the ZEW Firm Start-up Panel.
29Table 5: Bivariate Probit Model: probability ofsurvival and subsidisation
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Number ofobservations 2361 2240
Log likelihood function -1117.66 -1235.24
Mean ofsurvival probability 90.68% 91.79%
Survival equation
Variables Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-va1ue
Bridging Allowance -1.214 -1.15 -1.279 -1.55
Log size 0.112 0.73 0.126 0.87
Log size squared -0.023 -0.31 -0.072 -1.14
Corporatefirm Reference Reference
Non-corporatefirm -0.144 -0.89 -0.169 -1.07
Trade enterprise/sale proprietorship -0.398 -3.99 -0.291 -2.28
Manufacturing 0.058 0.35 0.156 0.89
Construction Reference Reference
Auto dealerships & repair services -0.080 -0.42 0.148 0.73
Wholesale trade -0.041 -0.26 -0.007 -0.05
Retail trade 0.193 1.47 0.269 1.98
Hospitality -0.584 -3.89 -0.192 -1.29
Communic.lTransp./Finance/lnsuran. -0.076 -0.44 0.071 0.48
Data Processing a -0.272 -1.26
Business-related services -0.234 -1.61 0.270 1.65
other services -0.021 -0.14 0.044 0.33
Network -0.169 -1.64 -0.292 -3.32
Diversification 0.039 0.28 0.099 0.73
Bremen Reference --- ---
Hanover -0.048 -0.34 --- ---
Kassel 0.384 2.17 --- ---
Essen 0.122 0.75 --- ---
Franken 0.248 1.39 --- ---
Rhein-HesseniPfalz 0.143 0.95 --- ---
Lower Bavaria 0.106 0.68 --- ---
Schwiibische Alb 0.370 2.13 --- ---
Schwerin --- --- Reference
EasJ Berlin --- --- 0.329 2.27
Pi'rna --- --- 0.049 0.51
Dessau --- --- 0.356 3.43
Female -0.147 -1.62 -0.1.76 -1.81
Log Age 12.098 4.03 -0.105 -0.32
Log Age squared -1.681 -4.02 0.034 0.68
Constant -20.094 -3.75 1.535 2.34
Correlation survival & subsidisation 0.528 1.20 0.634 2.07
30Table 5 continued
Subsidisation equation
Percentage ofsubsidised start-ups 5.25% 8.75%
Variables Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value
Unemployment to vacancy ratio 0.037 3.11 -0.031 -1.49
Corporate firm Reference Reference
Non-corporatefirm 0.666 3.74 0.033 0.23
Trade enterprise/sole proprietorship 0.512 3.18 0.256 1.47
Manufacturing -0.190 -1.00 0.162 1.02
Construction Reference Reference
Auto dealerships & repair services 0.080 0.39 0.215 1.16
Wholesale trade -0.320 -1.58 0.184 1.28
Retail trade -0.175 -1.25 0.028 0.22
Hospitality -0.473 -2.09 -0.001 -0.01
Communic.lTransp.lFinance/lnsuran. -0.229 -1.01 -0.241 -1.46
Data Processing tI 0.358 1.5 --- ---
Business-related services 0.043 0.25 0.018 0.12
other services -0.367 -1.82 -0.261 -1.80
Quarter 93.IV -0.617· -3.37 -0.608 -3.62
Quarter 94.1 -0.169 -1.12 -0.400 -2.96
Quarter 94:11 -0.565 -3.57 -0.700 -4.74
Quarter 94.111 -0.650 -2.96 -0.521 -3.51
Quarter 94:IV Reference Reference
Quarter 95.1 0.043 0.32 -0.231 -1.81
Quarter 95.11 -0.453 -2.41 -0.891 -5.54
Quarter 95.111 -0.947 -3.25
No additional share holder Reference Reference
J additional share holder -0.055 -0.31 0.483 2.57
2 additional share holders 0.497 2.40 0.505 2.24
3 and more additional share holders 0.152 0.50 0.510 1.68
Constant -1.752 -8.60 -1.117 -5.64
Note: Maximum likelihood estimition using a regional sample of the ZEW Firm Start-up Panel;
afor Eastern Germany the sectors data processing and other services were combined.
31Table Sa: Bivariate Probit Model: probability ofsurvival and subsidisation
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Number ofobservations 2411 3036
Log likelihood function -1164.499 -1700.886
Mean ofsurvival probability 90.21% 91.96%
Survival equation
Variables Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value
Bridging Allowance -l.020 -0.81 -1,049 -1,61
Corporatefirm Reference Reference
Non-corporate firm -0.256 -1.67 -0,252 -2,03
Trade enterprise!sole proprietorship -0.458 -4.93 -0,232 -2,26
Manufacturing 0.034 0.21
Construction Reference
Auto dealerships & repair services -0.146 -0.80
Wholesale trade -0.068 -0.44
Retail trade 0.142 - 1.14
Hospitality -0.586 -4.01
Communic.!Fransp.lFinance!Insuran. -0.111 -0.65
Data Processing a -0.255 -1.19
Business-related services -0.244 -1.74
other services -0.093 -0.63
Network -0.202 -2.06 -0,297 -3,98
Bremen Reference --- ---
Hanover -0.085 -0.61 --- ---
Kassel 0.367 2.12 --- ---
Essen 0.064 0.40 --- ---
Franken 0.210 1.20 --- ---
Rhein-Hessen/Pfalz 0.110 0.73 --- ---
Lower Bavaria 0.082 0.53 --- ---
Schwiibische Alb 0.246 1.50 --- ---
Schwerin --- --- Reference
East Berlin --- --- 0,251 2,15
Pima --- --- 0,081 0,98
Dessau --- --- 0,3.18 3,57
Log Age 11.898 4.03
Log Age squared -1.658 -4.02
Constant -19.586 -3.70 1,623 14,57
Correlation survival & subsidisation 0.463 0.86 0,539 2,10
32Table Sa continued
Subsidisation equation
Percentage ofsubsidised start-ups 5.14% 8.99%
Variables Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value
Unemployment to vacancy ratio 0.038 3.19 -0.025 -1.47
Corporatefirm Reference
Non-corporatefirm 0.671 3.73
Trade enterprise/sole proprietorship 0.508 3.16
Manufacturing -0.194 -1.03
Construction Reference
Auto dealerships & repair services 0.075 0.37
Wholesale trade -0.321 -1.59
Retail trade -0.184 -1.31
Hospitality -0.483 -2.13
Communic./Transp./Fillallce//llsuran. -0.246 -1.07
Data Processing 1I 0.357 1.51
Business-related services 0.026' 0.16
other services -0.378 -1.88
Quarter 93./V -0.620 -3.38 -0.609 -4.29
Quarter 94./ -0.175 -1.16 -0.447 -3.82
Quarter 94:ll -0.567 -3.58 -0.662 -5.38
Quarter 94./ll -0.659 -2.97 -0.490 -3.90
Quarter 94:/V Reference Reference
Quarter 95./ 0.043 0.31 -0.151 -1.40
Quarter 95.ll -0.460 -2.45 -0.881 -6.65
Quarter 95.ll/ -0.947 -3.25
No additional share holder Reference Reference
1 additional share holder -0.067 -0.39 0.189 2.28
2 additional share holders 0.487 2.36 0.292 2.08
3 and more additional share holders 0.136 0.45 0.070 0.29
Constant -1.749 -8.60 -0.871 -9.72
Note: Maximum likelihood estimation using a regional sample of the ZEW Firm Start-up Panel;
afor Eastern Germany the sectors data processing and other services were cOIpbined.
33Table 5b: Mortality rates and estimates of bridging allowances with alternative assumptions
about failure for unknown status
Region Western Germany Eastern Germany
Sample non subsidised subsidised non subsidised subsidised
10% failure 9.9% 9.9% 8.4% 6.3%
selected by chance -1.62 (t-value -1.98) -1.06 (t-value -1.78)
50% failure 29.2% 22.4% 20.4% 20.8%
selected by chance 0.18 (t-value 0.20) -1.35 (t-value -3.15)
100% failure 53.4% 41.7% 35.1% 35.2%
1.27 (t-value 3.97) -1.17 (t-value -3.35)
Source: Regional sample of the ZEW Firm Start-up Panel. The table shows the ratio of firms,
which did not survive the first year and the coefficient and t-values of bridging allowances on the
probability ofsurvival.
34Table 6 continued
Credit advised orpossible Reference Reference
Limited credit -0.288 -2.63 0.081 0.77
Secured credit -0.086 -0.69 0.087 0.97
No credit recommended -0.340 -0.87 -0.565 -1.59
No credits recommended -1.891 -3.07 -0.662 -2.10
. Constant -7.344 -2.23 0.049 0.10
Note: Maximum likelihood estimation using a regional sample of the ZEW Firm Start-up Panel;
for Eastem-Ge-rmany: a the sectors of data processing and other services were combined; b Pays
slowly, Payment after reminder and Payments overdue were combined.
36Table 6a: Probit model: existence ofadequate information on employment
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Number ofobservations 3746 4050
Log likelihoodfunction -2445.761 -2586.025
Chi square value 301.227 (27) 384.943 (24)
Variable Coefficient z-Value Coefficient z-Value
Bridging Allowance 0.228 2.26 0.105 1.50
Log size 0.299 3.47 0.254 3.30
Log size squared -0.054 -1.29 -0.031 -0.87
Corporate firm Reference
Non-corporate firm -0.140 -1.66
Trade enterprise I sale proprietorship -0.224 -4.04
Construction Reference Reference
Manufacturing -0.136 -1.49 -0.081 -0.83
Auto dealerships & repair services -0.083 -0.72 -0.080 -0.75
Wholesale trade -0.026 -0.29 -0.200 -2.30
Retail trade -0.033 -0.48 0.025 0.37
Hospitality -0.659 -7.72 -0.510 -6.09
CommunicationlTransportinglFinancellnsurance -0.213 -2.24 -0.323 -4.11
Data Processing II -0.441 -5.04 --- ---
Business-related services -0.261 -1.88 -0.307 -3.69
Other services -0.414 -4.99 -0.371 -5.09
Schwerin --- --- Reference
East Berlin --- --- -0.444 -5.93
Pima --- --- -0.132 -2.41
Dessau --- --- -0.092 -1.63
Diversificatipn 0.168 2.03 0.191 2.65
Log age 4.516 2.46
Log age squared -0.672 -2.63
Female -0.194 -3.75
Pays Bills Without delay Reference Reference
No Experience With Respect to Payment Behavior 0.102 0.85 0.282 4.53
Payment within 30 Days -0.526 -1.17 0.895 1.73
Payment takes longer -0.266 -0.59 -0.106 -0.82
Pa.vs slowly" -0.286 -1.27 -0.395 -1.49
Payment after reminder 1.990 2.79 --- ---
Pavmellts overdue 0.665 1.06 --- ---
Credit advised orpossihle Reference Reference
Limited credit -0.334 -3.50 -0.014 -0.16
Secured credit -0.109 -0.92 -0.017 -0.22
No credit recommended -0.343 -0.88 -0.312 -1.21
No credits recommended -1.901 -3.09 -0.719 -2.73
Constant -7.062 -2.15 -0.096 -1.08
Note: Maximum likelihood estimation using a regional sample of the ZEW Firm Start-up Panel;
for Eastern Germany: a the sectors of data processing and other services were combined; b Pays
slowly, Payment after reminder and Payments overdue were combined.
37Table 7: Simultaneous model ofemployment growth and subsidisation
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Number ofobservations 1879 1371
Log likelihood function -1460.89 -1246.94
Mean employment growth rate 16.27 % 15.70 %
Variable Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value
Growth equation
Bridf!.inf!. Allowance 0.018 0.08 0.036 0.25
Log size -0.361 -5.87 -0.318 -5.26
Lof!. size squared 0.078 3.06 0.033 1.24
Corporatefirm Reference Reference
Non-corporatefirm -0.163 -2.86 -0.080 -1.37
Trade enterprise I sole proprietorship -0.227 -6.09 -0.124 -2.90
Manufaeturing 0.030 0.68 -0.015 -0.24
Construction Reference Reference
Auto dealerships & repair services 0.023 0.41 -0.091 -1.19
Wholesale trade -0.079 -1.44 -0.166 -2.84
Retail trade -0.101 -2.38 -0.247 -5.21
Hospitality 0.045 0.45 0.105 1.52
Communic./Transport.lFinanceilnsurance -0.054 -0.98 -0.135 -1.82
Data Processing
(J 0.008 0.12 --- ---
Business-related services 0.026 0.39 -0.139 -2.59
other services -0.076 -1.23 -0.217 -3.58
Schwerin --- --- Reference
East Berlin --- --- 0.136 2.59
Pima --- --- 0.159 4.22
Dessau --- --- 0.180 4.49
Bremen Reference --- ---
Hanover -0.036 -0.76 --- ---
Kassel -0.014 -0.29 --- ---
Essen -0.113 -2.18 --- ---
Franken -0.076 -1.44 --- ---
Rhein-HessenlPfalz -0.047 -1.07 --- ---
Niederbayem -0.091 -1.86 --- ---
Schwabische Alb -0.045 -0.99 --- ---
Diversification 0.013 0.28 -0.078 -1.75
Network 0.014 0.41 0.067 2.03
Log age 1.608 1.13 0.005 0.00
Log age squared -0.239 -1.19 0.003 0.02
Female -0.007 -0.21 -0.008 -0.18
Constant -2.101 -0.82 0.628 0.25
Inverse Mills Ratio ( -0.047 -0.25 -0.292 -2.29
Correlation ~rowth & suhsidisation -0.024 -0.08 -0.183 -0.93
38Table 7 continued
Subsidisation equation
Share of subsidised start-ups 5.59 % 9.92 %
Unemployment to vacancy ratio 0.041 2.37 -0.022 -0.59
Corporate firm Reference Reference
Non-corporatefirm 0.724 3.37 0.044 0.23
Trade enterprise / sole proprietorship 0.331 1.46 0.253 1.17
Manufacturing -0.134 -0.61 -0.063 -0.32
Construction Reference Reference
Auto dealerships &repair servo 0.025 0.11 -0.062 -0.25
Wholesale trade -0.221 -1.00 -0.041 -0.20
Retail trade -0.262 -1.68 -0.021 -0.14
Hospitality -0.664 -2.28 -0.293 -t.14
Communic.lTransport.lFinallceilnsuran. -0.230 -0.91 -0.450 -1.84
Data Processing 1I -0.023 -0.11 --- ---
Business-related services 0.437 1.58 -0.024 -0.12
Other services -0.423 -1.74 -0.360 -1.73
No additional share holder Reference Reference
1additional share holder -0.175 -0.73 0.399 1.73
2 additional share holders 0.316 1.13 0.142 0.45
3 and more additional share holders 0.081 0.21 0.649 1.87
Quarter 93.IV -0.519 -2.41 -0.650 -2.72
Quarter 94.1 -0.080 -0.44 -0.305 -1.50
Quarter 94:11 -0.424 -2.29 -0.767 -3.79
Quarter 94.111 -0.509 -2.06 -0.609 -3.06
Quarter 94:IV Reference Reference
Quarter 95.1 0.106 0.64 -0.190 -1.10
Quarter 95.11 -0.347 -1.64 -0.967 -4.65
Quarter 95.111 -0.889 -2.58 --- ---
Constant -1.639 -5.31 -0.942 -3.95
Note: Maximum likelihood estimation using a regional sample of the ZEW Firm Start-up Panel;
a for Eastern Germany the sectors of data processing and other services were combined; C selection
for existence ofinformation on employment growth. Furthermore 9 time dummies for the different
observation intervals are included.
39Table 7a: Simultaneous model ofemployment growth and subsidisation
Western Germany C Eastern Germany
Number ofobservations 1890 1783
Log likelihood function --- -1791.802
Adjusted R-squared 0,101 ---
Mean employment growth rate 16.16% 15.39 %
Variable Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value
Growth equation
Bridging Allowance 0.075 0.32 -0.013 -0.07
Log size -0.382 -8.64 -0.338 -6.05
Log size squared 0.080 4.17 0.050 2.04
Corporate firm Reference Reference
Non-corporate firm -0.145 -3.47 -0.095 -1.77
Trade enterprise / sole proprietorship -0.207 -7.40 -0.149 -3.63
. Manufacturing 0.035 0.84 -0.045 -0.71
Construction Reference Reference
Auto dealerships & repair services 0.018 0.35 -0.108 -1.34
Wholesale trade -0.088 -2.13 -0.129 -2.69
Retail trade -0.108 -3.33 -0.239 -6.12
Hospitality 0.114 1.87 0.039 0.67
Communic./Transport.lFinance/Insurance -0.044 -0.94 -0.173 -2.68
Data Processing a 0.035 0.69 --- ---
Business-related services 0.014 0.21 -0.134 -2.36
other services -0.039 -0.82 -0.262 -4.78
Schwerin --- --- Reference
East Berlin --- ---I
0.102 1.96
Pima --- 0.130 3.65
Dessau --- --- 0.159 4.39
Constant 0.622 8.94 0.655 7.02
Inverse Mills Ratio d -0.176 -1.96 -0.170 -1.62
Correlation growth & subsidisation -0.043 -0.38 -0.075 -0.32
40Table 7a continued
Subsidisation equation
Log likelihood function -371.824 ---
Share of subsidised start-ups 5.56 % 9.83 %
Unemployment to vacancy ratio 0.042 3.11
Corporate firm Reference
Non-corporatefirm 0.635 3.71
Trade enterprise I sole proprietorship 0.318 2.55
Manufacturing -0.143 -0.73
Construction Reference
Auto dealerships & repair servo 0.015 0.07
Wholesale trade -0.213 -1.06
Retail trade -0.259 -1.77
Hospitality -0.688 -2.54
Communic.lTransport.lFinancellnsuran. -0.205 - -0.91
Data Processing 1I -0.015 -0.08
Business-related services 0.386 1.51
Other services -0.408 -1.80
Quarter 93./V -0.505 -2.48 -0.742 -4.19
Quarter 94.1 \ -0.077 -0.45 -0.383 -2.66
Quarter 94.1/ -0.431 -2.49 -0.747 -4.75
Quarter 94.11/ -0.516 -2.22 -0.499 -3.07
Quarter 94.lV Reference Reference
Quarter 95./ 0.102 0.66 -0.122 -0.88
Quarter 95.11 -0.353 -1.78 -0.924 -5.68
Quarter 95.111 -0.902 -2.99 --- ---
Constant -1.635 -9.26 -0.810 -7.59
Note: Western Germany Two-stage-Ieast-square-Estimation and Eastern Germany Maximum
likelihood estimation using a regional sample of the ZEW Firm Start-up Panel; a for Eastern
Germany the sectors of data processing and other services were combined; C the 2SLS estimation
for Western Germany reports the Adjusted R-squared, the correlation between subsidisation and
growth is represented by the Inverse of the MiJJs Ratio and the Log-Likelihood value for the
separated subsidisation equation is also reported; d selection for existence of information on
employment growth. Furthermore 9 time dummies for the different observation intervals are
included.
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Source: Regional sample of the ZEW Firm Start-up Panel, Bureau of Labor, own calculations;
Slellenandrangsfaklor means unemployment to vacancy ratio.
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